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Abstract
Existing education systems are facing a threat of question paper leaking (QPL) in the exam which jeopardizes the quality of
education. Therefore, it is high time to think about a more secure and flexible question sharing system which can prevent QPL issue
in the future education system. Blockchain enables a way of creating and storing transactions, contracts or anything that requires
protection against tampering, accessing etc. This paper presents a new scheme for smart education, by utilizing the concept of
blockchain, for question sharing. A two-phase encryption technique for encrypting question paper (QSP) is proposed. In the
first phase, QSPs are encrypted using timestamp and in the second phase, previous encrypted QSPs are encrypted again using
a timestamp, salt hash and hashes from previous QSPs. These encrypted QSPs are stored in the blockchain along with a smart
contract which helps the user to unlock the selected QSP. An algorithm is also proposed for selecting a QSP for the exam which
picks a QSP randomly. Moreover, a timestamp based lock is imposed on the scheme so that no one can decrypt the QSP before
the allowed time. Finally, security is analyzed by proving different propositions and the superiority of the proposed scheme over
existing schemes is proven through a comparative study based on the different features.
Keywords: Blockchain, distributed system, encryption, Internet of Things, smart education, randomization algorithm
1. Introduction
Blockchain is a brilliant discovery which has brought a rev-
olution in the realm of technology. This revolutionary idea was
inaugurated by Satoshi
Nakamoto [1], a person or group used this pseudonym in or-
der to keep their individuality concealed. Blockchain is a peer-
to-peer (P2P) distributed ledger, introduced within the concept
of bitcoin cryptocurrencies, which stores the history of trans-
actions with the payload [2]. However, blockchain technol-
ogy is not bound within doing financial transactions. It has
started to draw the interest of the stakeholders of a wide span
of industries which covers finance, healthcare, utilities, real
estate, government sector, and digital content distribution etc.
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], due to its flexibility and security mecha-
nism. The concept of blockchain was employed in the database
named ”BigchainDB”, a database which is capable of piling
large quantity data [9].
Blockchain is a data structure which is distributed and repli-
cated amongst the participated nodes in the network. When a
transaction happens in the network, that transaction has to expe-
rience validation called consensus mechanism, a process where
some of the participants reach a mutual agreement in allowing
that transaction [10]. Those who perform consensus mecha-
nism, are called miners and they have to execute a computa-
tionally hard puzzle. After that, a block is added to the chain
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including that transaction. Each block contains the hash of the
previous block. That is why it is called blockchain. The first
block of the blockchain is called genesis block. In the place of
previous block’s hash, it contains 0 or some other value which
means it does not refer the previous block’s hash. In most of the
blockchain application, genesis block is hard coded [11]. How-
ever, blockchain is tamper proof. If anyone makes any changes
in the transaction then the hash of that block also changes which
breaks the chain. Then a user has to mine the chain again in or-
der to make the changes valid. Moreover, that user has to make
changes in other participants node which makes it very difficult.
Furthermore, asymmetric cryptography is adopted in order
to issue transactions in blockchains [12]. In blockchain, every
user has two keys, such as 1) public key, and 2) secret key. The
public key plays a role as an address in the system. On the other
hand, the secret key is utilized to sign transactions [13]. Thus
blockchain creates a trustless network where all users’ identi-
ties are hidden and parties can transact securely without trusting
each other [2].
Internet of Things (IoT) has brought another revolution in
the realm of technology [14, 15, 16, 17]. Recently, IoT has
put its mark in the education sector [18, 19]. Smart campus,
smart classroom, digital content, smart exam, remote learning,
campus safety etc. are the results of IoT. In order to improve the
quality of education, a lot of researches are going on. However,
IoT technology is facing security risks. Though there are a lot
of existing security protocols, they are not adequate to provide
security because of the decentralized structure of IoT. Entities
in IoT need reliable and tamper-proof protection from attacks
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like denial-of-sleep and denial-of-service [20]. Blockchain can
mitigate this issues with its security infrastructure [21, 22].
Examination is one of the important parts of the education
system because it not only evaluates the understanding of stu-
dents but also forces them to study [23, 24]. However, there is a
threat, named Question Paper Leaking (QPL), which can cause
the fairness issues in the examinations. Nowadays, QPL is a
serious issue throughout the world from university entrance ex-
amination to public examination, and the situation is worse in
developing countries [25, 26, 27, 28]. The QPL can bring some
serious outcome, such as (1) quality of education compromised
and (2) erosion of ethical standards [28].
ACT Inc, who is the creator of the United States’ most pop-
ular college entrance examination, canceled some college en-
trance exams after leaking the test materials [29]. In the United
Kingdom, Brighton Hove and Sussex Sixth Form College can-
celed A-level physics exam after noticing the question paper
leak on social media [30]. In China, a teacher was accused
of leaking math test paper of the annual postgraduate entrance
exam [31]. In the University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Ap-
plied Human Sciences, at least four exam papers in two subjects
were leaked [32]. In Egypt, French language exam papers were
posted after half an hour after the exam started [33], and a ver-
sion of Arabic exam was leaked on the first day of Thanaweya
Amma examinations [34]. A teacher from Vietnam leaked fi-
nal examination paper to the son of a neighbor [35]. In Nepal,
the question papers of International English Language Testing
System examination [36] and Bachelor of Medicine and Bach-
elor of Surgery entrance examination of the Tribhuvan Univer-
sity Institute of Medicine [37] were leaked. In 2017, a num-
ber of incidents related to exam paper leak happened in Pak-
istan [38, 39, 40, 41, 42] and India [43, 44, 45], respectively.
In Bangladesh, Junior School Certificate and Secondary School
Certificate examination questions were leaked [46, 47]. In Ko-
rea, a high school teacher was accused of leaking English test
questions [48].
Though the aforementioned cases [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48] only cov-
ers the QPL incidents happened in 2017, some countries face
this problem almost in every year. Hence, it can be said that
QPL happens not only within the developing and underdevel-
oped countries, but also in developed countries. In QPL inci-
dents, not only the students, but also the teachers and authorities
are involved. Therefore, it is required to develop a smart ex-
amination system which can share examination papers securely
without the fear of QPL.
In order to digitalize the examination system, different ideas
are shared in the literature [49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55]. In [49],
three models of web examination system, such as B/S, C/S, and
B/S combined with C/S are discussed, along with the technical
details and solution of the problem of concurrent data. An-
other web based examination system was proposed for distant
and formal education in [50]. In this system, teachers enter
examination questions and number of the students. The sys-
tem automatically shuffles questions and answers so that ev-
ery student can get a different pattern of questions to prevent
cheating. In [51], an online examination system for PE the-
ory courses was proposed, where every user uses username and
password given by the administrators to login the system. The
system maintains the question distribution and the time sched-
ule of examination. In [52], an online examination system was
proposed, where MD5 encryption technique was exploited for
protecting password and resources. Morevoer, a WEB-INF Di-
rectory is used so that students cannot access the contents di-
rectly without authorization. An examination management sys-
tem, based on flat network, was demonstrated by [53]. The sys-
tem provides role based security, where students can only sign
up and give examinations. In [54], a web-based examination
system was proposed to integrate with existing learning man-
agement systems, whereas an online examination system based
on TCP/IP client-server architecture and spiral model was pro-
posed in [55]. These systems mainly focus on system design
and overall management. However, they could not guarantee to
solve the QPL incidents.
From the recent incidents of QPL, it is obvious that all levels
of people are involved. Moreover, social engineering, phishing
etc., can loot anyone credential and can access data anytime.
Furthermore, a system with large scale, like implementing a
system for the national education system which demands dis-
tributed computing, examination paper sharing and storing, are
very vulnerable. Therefore, examination management systems
need more than user credential and random question selection.
Question sharing (QS) should be performed through a more ro-
bust system, where user credential will be less important. In
such a system, even though unauthorized persons get the pass-
word, they could not be able to access the questions before ex-
ams. Blockchain prevents data from altering once it’s being
mined in the chain. Moreover, blockchain assists to maintain
access permission and audit process seamlessly. Blockchain
can be one of the promising techniques to provide security
against the aforementioned threats.
In this paper, a blockchain based smart and secured QS
scheme for smart education system (termed as BSSSQS) is pro-
posed, a topic which has not been explored yet to the best of our
knowledge. The major contributions of this paper are compiled
as follows.
• The proposed scheme can increase the security of ques-
tions and provide seamless sharing among the examination
centers.
• A two-phase encryption technique (using different param-
eters as a key) is proposed in order to provide security over
question.
• A randomization algorithm is proposed for selecting a
question paper (QSP) before the exam.
• A design of smart contract is proposed for managing user
authorization over blocks along with decrypting QSP from
blockchain.
• A timestamp based lock is proposed. In the proposed
scheme, every exam center will hold the QSP, but no one
can access (or request) it without system permission.
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The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows:
Section 2 illustrates the system model of BSSSQS. The differ-
ent components of BSSSQS are also discussed in this section.
In Section 3, different transactions of BSSSQS are discussed
in details. A security analysis along with performance com-
parisons among BSSSQS and others existing model is demon-
strated in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 draws a conclusion from
this paper with future research directions.
2. Proposed Blockchain based System Model
We devise a QS scheme which uses blockchain concept in
order to make it secure and smart. The proposed BSSSQS is
a new way of sharing questions. There are four major entities
such as Question Setter (QUS), Question Cloud (QC), BSSSQS
Master (BSSSQSmaster), and BSSSQS Minion (BSSSQSminion)
involved in this scheme1, as shown in Fig. 1. Each of the enti-
ties is described in the following subsections.
2.1. Question Setter (QUS)
In this entity, actors have to submit questions for the exam.
They have a deadline for submitting questions. They are the
initial actors of preparing questions for the exam. They can
modify or delete questions before submitting. But once they
submit the question, they lose the option of performing any kind
of CRUD (Create, Read, Update, and Delete [56]) operation.
Every actor in this entity has a unique signature to communicate
securely with the next entity called question cloud (QC).
2.2. Question Cloud
This entity involves initial management for questions. Af-
ter getting questions from QUS over a secure channel, it stores
questions before sending it to the next entity. In this entity,
questions experience modification including shuffling, adding,
dropping etc. to prepare QSPs, where a QSP consists of a set
of questions. Then, the QSPs are handed over to the next en-
tity. Note that after handing over to the next entity, QSPs are
automatically removed from QC. This entity consists of seven
modules, as shown in Fig. 2. The functions of each module are
summarized as below.
• Question Cloud Manager (QCM): Manages internal func-
tionality.
• Signature Verifier (SV): Verifies signatures of requesters.
• Format Question (FQ): Formates and modifies question if
it requires.
• Question pool (QNP): Stores modified questions.
• Question Filter (QF): Sorts and makes sets of questions
before sending to next entity.
1Note that the main task of Blockchain cloud in Fig. 1 is to create communi-
cation channels by which BSSSQSmaster and BSSSQSminion can communicate
with each other.
• Question Queue (QQ): Stores questions temporarily be-
fore sending to next entity.
• Database (DB): Contains signature, course information
etc.
2.3. BSSSQS Master (BSSSQSmaster)
This is a very complex and crucial entity. Questions expe-
rience final modification in this entity. This entity holds the
information of all the connected minions (node) to which it
sends QSPs. This entity also maintains communication with
its minions through blockchain cloud. If any of the minions
need verification or any kind of approval to exercise any ac-
tion, BSSSQSmaster responds right away. It not only maintains
communication but also selects a QSP, which minion used to
take the exam based on that picked out QSP. This entity is also
very important for its encryption mechanism. It performs a two-
phase encryption in each of the QSPs and creates a smart con-
tract for BSSSQSminion. This entity consists of thirteen mod-
ules, as shown in Fig. 2. The functions of each module are
summarized as below.
• Question Queue (QNQ): Stores QSPs temporarily.
• BSSSQS Master Manager (BMM): Manages internal
functionality.
• Timestamp (TS): Converts date and time to timestamp.
• Question Set (QS): Organizes QSPs based on the course
list.
• Salt Engine (SE): Generates random salt hash for encryp-
tion.
• Data Encryptor (DE): Encrypts QSPs based on the selected
timestamp.
• Encryption Factory (EF): Encrypts QSPs based on the se-
lected parameters.
• Hash Generator (HG): Generates hash of QSPs based on
the content, last access time, nonce etc.
• Contract Generator (CG): Generates smart contract based
on the input.
• Database (DB): Stores data of courses, minions, question
hashes etc.
• Guffy Bot (GB): Monitors tasks and also waits for instruc-
tions like re-establish connection with inactive minions,
select a QSP etc.
• Question Picker (QP): Selects a QSP for the exam.
• Exclusion Pool (EP): Stores QSPs which gets illegal re-
quests.
3
Question 
Cloud (QC)
BSSSQS
Master
(BSSSQSmaster) 
Question
Setter 
(QUS)
qu
es
tio
n
BSSSQS Minion 
(BSSSQSminion)
Blockchain Cloud
BSSSQS Minion 
(BSSSQSminion)
BSSSQS Minion 
(BSSSQSminion)
BSSSQS Minion 
(BSSSQSminion)
BSSSQS Minion 
(BSSSQSminion)
BSSSQS Minion 
(BSSSQSminion)
BSSSQS Minion 
(BSSSQSminion)
Figure 1: System model of the proposed BSSSQS.
Figure 2: Components of BSSSQS.
2.4. BSSSQS Minion (BSSSQSminion)
This is an edge entity which contains exam center, e.g.
school, college, university etc. This entity contains processed
QSPs in the blockchain. No one can access QSPs with-
out experiencing smart contract, timestamp verification, etc.
Even though anyone manages to access blockchain storage,
he/she can not see the contents of QSPs, because QSPs are en-
crypted using a two-phase encryption technique in the proposed
BSSSQS. This entity consists of eight modules, as shown in
Fig. 2. The functions of each module are summarized as below.
• BSSSQS Minion Manager (BMNM): Manages internal
functionality.
• Blockchain (BC): Blockchain based storage which con-
tains QSPs.
• Minion Bot (MB): Monitors internal activity like system
activeness status (online/offline), crosscheck request vali-
dation etc.
• Smart Contract Manager (SCM): Handles authorization
requests and decrypts QSPs.
• Database (DB): Contains decrypted QSPs and other local
data.
• User Panel (UP): Provides user interface and manages
tasks.
• Session Manager (SM): Contains information related to
user activeness and authorization.
• User Authentication and Authorization Manager
(UAAM): verifies user authentication and and man-
ages user authorization.
2.5. BSSSQSmaster vs BSSSQSminion
BSSSQS contains private blockchain which has different
kinds of access permission for different entities. BSSSQSmaster
has write permission, whereas BSSSQSminion has only condi-
tional read permission. BSSSQSminion can access blockchain
only through smart contract when BSSSQSmaster sends permis-
sion notification to BSSSQSminion. Note that the final version of
QSPs is stored only in the minion entities, though master entity
keeps track (e.g., hash) of QSPs.
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Notation Description
η Nonce
ρ Prime number
Q Question
τc Current timestamp
S~ Salt hash
QT Questionnaire token
PW Password
Θ(.) One way key generation function
ξkey(.) Encryption function using key
ζkey(.) Decryption function using key
Q Encrypted question
sm Smart contract
Table 1: Notations and their description
QUS QC
D1 = ( η, Creq(QT) )
 D2 = ( η+1, ℘  ( S  ⦻ (Gx,Gy) ) )
D3 = ( η+2, ξ℘  ( QT, PW ) )
 D4 = ( η+3, Sτ )
D5 = ( η+4, ξ℘  (ξωsig(Q) ) )
Figure 3: Transactions between QUS and QC.
3. Transactions in BSSSQS
In this section, we describe the different types of transactions
performed in BSSSQS. The list of important notations with re-
lated descriptions which are used in this section, are summa-
rized in Table 1.
3.1. Transactions between QUS and QC
Basically two types of major transactions, such as authenti-
cation of QUS and questions hand over to QC, take place be-
tween QUS and QC. Every user in QUS has a unique signa-
ture, which is stored in QC. Each user has to prove his identity
with proper credentials to send questions to QC. The transac-
tions are provided in the Fig. 3. The proposed scheme con-
siders that all communication between QUS and QC is done
by employing asymmetric key encryption (i.e. elliptic curve
digital signature algorithm (ECDSA)). Before sending ques-
tions, QUS sends a request to QC in order to get public key of
QC so that QUS can communicate with QC in a secured chan-
nel. QUS sends request, containing a nonce η, by sending data
D1 = (η,Creq(QT )). After getting request from QUS, QC gen-
erates one time asymmetric keys (OTAK) for QUS so that QUS
can transfer not only credentials but also questions employing
OTAK. QC generates a secret key S κ and a public key ℘κ. Let
κ is the set of OTAK.
κ = {(ϕ, ψ) : ϕ ∈ S κ ∩ ψ ∈ ℘κ |
S κ = Θ((η + 1) ∗ ρ, τc,QT,S~) ∩ ℘κ = S κ ⊗ (Gx,Gy)} (1)
Here, ρ is a large prime number, τc is current timestamp, S~
is a salt hash and G is a set of (x, y) coordinates on the ellip-
tic curve. When QC finishes generating OTAK, QC sends ℘κ
by sending D2 = (n + 1, ℘κ = S κ ⊗ (Gx,Gy)). Upon receiv-
ing D2, QUS encrypts QT and PW employing ξ℘κ (QT, PW).
Following this, QUS increases n + 1 by 1 and sends data D3
to QCM. When QC receives D3, QC first decrypts data utiliz-
ing ζS κ (ξ℘κ (QT, PW)) and checks validity of the credential that
provided from QUS. If the credential is valid then QC returns
success token by sending D4 = (η+3, S τ). Before sending ques-
tions, QUS needs to sign question with its digital signature in
order to prove that the questions are coming from the intended
person. First, QUS creates signature using QT and PW. Let
ωsig is the signature.
ωsig = Θ(QT, PW) (2)
QUS first encrypts question using ωsig and then encrypts
using ℘κ. After the encryption, QUS sends D5 = (η +
4, ξ℘κ (ξωsig (Q))). As QC receives data from QUS, QC decrypts
ξ℘κ (ξωsig (Q)) by employing ζS κ (ξ℘κ (ξωsig (Q))). QC generates sig-
nature employing Eq. (2) and validates the identity of the per-
son by decrypting question with sender’s signature.
3.2. Transactions between QC and BSSSQSmaster
Here, transactions are divided into two main categories, as
shown in Fig. 4, such as 1) processing questions within different
modules of QC, and 2) sending QSPs from QQ to BSSSQSmaster
for further processing. After the deadline of questions submis-
sion, FQ formates and modifies questions following the pre-
scribed rules and regulations set by the exam authority, to pre-
pare QSPs. Questions formatting and modification can contain
actions like shuffling contents, adding or removing contents etc.
Only the authorized person from exam committee can do that
or the exam authority can make this process automatic using
randomization and weighted policy. The QSPs are then sent
to QNP. In QNP, questions are stored temporarily and wait for
next instruction. After getting proper instructions from QCM,
QSPs are sent to QF. QF selects some QSPs based on certain
criteria and forwards these selected QSPs to QQ for gathering
them before sending to BSSSQSmaster. When the collection is
finished, QQ sends QSPs to BSSSQSmaster through a proper se-
cure channel.
3.3. Transactions between BSSSQSmaster and BSSSQSminion
This segment covers transactions between BSSSQSmaster and
BSSSQSminion, as shown in Fig. 5. The primary tasks of
BSSSQSmaster are summarized as follows:
• To encrypt QSPs and send these encrypted QSPs to
BSSSQSminion.
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Figure 4: Transactions between QC and BSSSQSmaster.
• To select a QSP for the exam and send permission notifi-
cation to BSSSQSminion for accessing the selected QSP.
BSSSQSmaster plays very significant roles for providing secu-
rity to QSPs. The proposed scheme considers that all commu-
nication between BSSSQSmaster and BSSSQSminion is done by
employing symmetric key encryption. Initially, questions are
stored in QNQ. After getting QSPs from QNQ, BMM picks cur-
rent timestamp τc by sending request to TS. In the subsequent
stage, BMM pulls course list from DB so that it can command
other modules to make sets of blocks containing QSPs based on
the course. Next, BMM sends QSPs to QS with τc and course
list. Then, QSPs experience two-phase encryption which is de-
scribed as follows.
3.3.1. First-phase encryption
The first phase of encryption is managed by QS. Firstly, QS
requests SE for generating salt hash S~. After getting S~ from
SE, QS stores it for next phase of encryption. Secondly, QS
sends QSPs to DE with τc. DE is then encrypts QSPs with τc.
Let Qi is the ith number of QSPs. Therefore, ith number of QSPs
that experience the first phase of encryption is written by
Q1i = ξτc {Qi, τc} (3)
Finally, QS sends encrypted QSPs to EF with τc and S~.
3.3.2. Second-phase encryption
The second and final phase of encryption happens in EF.
Recall that in the blockchain, the first block is called genesis
block. EF generates a default genesis block with random text
and encrypt it with τc. After creating genesis block, EF en-
crypts QSPs and converts these QSPs into blocks. Each block
contains header and data. In the header, it carries the previous
block hash, timestamp, last access time, block creation time,
and nonce. Every time EF encrypts a QSP, it sends that en-
crypted QSP to HG. HG is then generate a hash from that en-
crypted QSP, so that the hash can participate in the next QSP
encryption. Therefore, the encrypted QSP that experience the
second phase of encryption is written by
Q2i =

ξτc {Q1i , τc}, if i = 0
ξ{τc,µQ~ ,S~}{Q1i , τc, µQ~ ,S~}, if i > 0
(4)
where µQ~ =
⋃i−1
σ=0 Q~σ. The hash of ith QSP is generated by
Q~i = SHA256(Q
2
i )
Then, HG stores the generated hash in DB for QSP selection.
After that, EF commands CG to generate smart contract includ-
ing the information ofQ~, τc, and S~. Fig. 6 illustrates a coding
structure for smart contract. Smart contract contains hashes of
QSPs, timestamp, and salt hash.
As smart contract is created dynamically based on the exam,
so id and title of contract title exam {id} {title} are different for
each exam as shown in Fig. 6. When smart contract generation
is finished, CG encrypts the smart contract with a timestamp
τsm and a random salt hash Sr. Let Csm is the encrypted smart
contract.
Csm = ξ{Θ(τsm,Sr)}{sm,Θ(τsm,Sr)} (5)
After the encryption, CG stores the key in DB. When exam
comes,
BSSSQSmaster sends the key along with a selected question
hash. After getting the encrypted smart contract from CG, EF
sends blocks and smart contract to GB. GB monitors tasks like
re-establish connection with inactive minions, select a QSP etc.
As GB gets blocks and contract, it initiates the process of send-
ing these resources to BSSSQSminion. At first, GB pulls existing
minion list from DB. When GB get all of the lists, it starts to
send blocks and contract to BSSSQSminion through blockchain
cloud. GB remains always active for monitoring the system.
When the time comes to select a QSP for exam, GB sends an
instruction to QP for initiating the process of selecting a QSP
for the exam along with Csm and notifying minions about that
QSP. Before initiating random engine for picking out a QSP, QP
pulls hash of QSPs from DB. In the meantime, it also requests
EP to send the hashes of excluded QSPs. When QP gathers all
the required information, it starts the process of selecting a QSP
as follows. Firstly, QP removes the excluded QSPs from the set
of QSPs. Therefore, the set of filtered QSPs QF is written by
QF = {χ : χ ∈ QP ∩ χ < QE} (6)
where QP is the set of all QSPs and QE is the set of excluded
QSPs. Secondly, QP takes a collection of 10 large prime num-
bers which is represented by
ρ = {ρi ∈ P | 0 ≤ i ≤ 9}
where P = {χ : χ ∈ N ∩ χ is prime} (7)
After that it converts the current date and time into a times-
tamp τ. To select any two prime numbers from ρ, QP takes last
digit dlτ and second last digit d
sl
τ from t to select prime numbers
pdlτ and pdslτ , respectively. The selected QSP to take the exam is
represented by
Qs = {(pdlτ − Q f n) ∗ pdslτ } mod Q f n (8)
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Figure 5: Transactions between BSSSQSmaster and BSSSQSminion.
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Figure 6: Proposed coding structure of smart contract.
where Q f n is the total number of fil-
tered QSPs and pdlτ ≥ Q f n. Let ρ ={179426549, 24066347, 179424793, 15486511, ...., 17142407},
τ = 1515552555821, dlτ = 1, d
sl
τ = 2, pdlτ = 24066347,
pdslτ = 179424793, and Q f n = 50. The value of Qs is then com-
puted as Qs = {(24066347−50)∗179424793} mod 50 = 21. It
means that 21th QSP is selected from the collection of 50 QSPs
for the exam. As QP selects a QSP, it notifies all BSSSQSminion
about the selection through blockchain cloud.
3.4. Transactions in BSSSQSminion
This section covers transactions between different modules
of BSSSQSminion which is illustrated by Fig. 7. Note that U
in Fig. 7 represents a user in the system. The transactions are
broadly categorized into three following types.
1. Storing and maintaining QSP blocks in blockchain.
2. Updating smart contract and
3. Alerting authority about the permission to access QSPs.
After getting blocks and smart contract from BSSSQSmaster, the
following steps are performed sequentially in BSSSQSminion as
follows:
1. BMNM sends blocks to BC and BC updates his data.
2. BMNM sends smart contract to SCM for the selected
exam.
3. BMNM gets QSP selection notification from
BSSSQSmaster. The meaning of notification is that
user can request for the process of decrypting the selected
QSP. But If a user tries to request before allowed time,
SCM doesn’t transmit the request to blockchain. However,
BMNM passes this notification to UP and UP alerts users
when they enter the system.
4. When a user tries to enter UP, he has to go through a
validation process. If the session of that user is expired
then UP requests UAAM to corroborate the user. UAAM
sends a request to DB to send information regarding the re-
quested signature. If the user is valid, DB returns user in-
formation, otherwise, it reruns empty data. When UAAM
gets validation from DB, it stores a token in SM for main-
taining user session.
5. Every minion manages its users by itself. After that,
UAAM notifies UP about the response. As users get a no-
tification about the QSP and key for decrypting Csm, they
request for QSP through UP. UP requests SCM to start the
decryption process. Before going further, SCM sends a
command to MB to check whether QSP is unlocked for
access or not.
6. MB affirms authorization with BSSSQSmaster through
blockchain cloud. When SCM gets proper authorization,
it transfers the request to BC. BC performs final authoriza-
tion check with BSSSQSmaster through MB. If BC gets an
unauthorized request with a QSP, it changes access time
and nonce, and mines the chain again. It changes the sig-
nature of all the QSPs and no one can get its key hash.
7. Whenever BC gets an affirmative result, it sends the QSP
to SCM for decrypting.
First, SM decrypts Csm in order to decrypts the selected QSP.
Let Dsm is the decrypted smart contract.
Dsm = ζ{Θ(τsm,Sr)}{Csm,Θ(τsm,Sr)} (9)
After getting Dsm, QSP decryption process begins. Let Q is
a selected encrypted QSP. By utilizing µQ~ in Eq. (4), the first
phase of decryption is written by
DQ1 = ζ{τc,µQ~ ,S~}{Q, τc, µQ~ ,S~} (10)
Finally, DQ1 goes through the second phase of decryption
which is written by
DQ2 = ζτc {DQ1 , τc} (11)
where DQ2 is the QSP which experiences the second phase of
decryption. Note that the decrypted QSP is the original form of
the QSP. After decryption, SC stores the QSP to DB and sends
a notification to UP about the outcome. Now, users can access
the QSP in original form. Finally, users can retrieve QSP from
DB to take an exam.
4. Security and performance analysis
In this section, we discuss the security and performance of
the proposed BSSSQS in order to illustrate to the feasibility of
BSSSQS.
4.1. Security analysis
In this section, we propose different propositions related to
security and performance and also provide proof of each propo-
sition.
Proposition 1. The secret key of QC is well protected from the
adversary.
Proof. Qc’s secret key is generated utilizing nonce added by 1
which is η + 1, a large prime ρ, timestamp τc of that time, QT
and a random S~, as mentioned in Eq. (1). Suppose, adversary
A wants to steal the secret key of QC. Only one way to get
the secret key of QC is to guess the private key to the best of
8
Figure 7: Transactions in BSSSQSminion.
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our knowledge, as QC never share its private key to anyone.
However, in ECDSA, the secret key is 32 bytes or 256 bits long.
In order to guess the correct secret key, A needs to guess the
sequence of 256. For 256 bits, there are 2256 possible sequences
and among of them, only one can be the QC’s secret key. The
probability of guessing the secret key, which is 256-bit long, is
1
2256
= 2−256, which is practically not feasible. Moreover, if A
wants to guess properties of the secret key individually, A has
to face the probability of randomness in each property which is
also practically not feasible. Furthermore, OTAK is temporary,
when questions are transferred successfully, OTAK, which is
generated for particular QUS, is removed from QC. Therefore,
the secret key may become obsolete while A is still trying to
guess the secret key. Thus, QC’s secret key is well protected
from the adversary.
Proposition 2. Communication between QUS and QC is secure
even in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Proof. The motive behind the communication between QUS
and QC is to transfer questions from QUS to QC. There is a
set of task has to be performed before sending questions. In
order to send questions, QUS requires QC’s public key to cre-
ate a digital signature using Eq. (2) and encrypt questions em-
ploying ξ℘κ (Q). However, when QUS request for OTAK, QC
generates OTAK utilizing Eq. (1). When QUS gets ℘κ, Firstly,
QUS validates its identity by transmitting QT and PW, which
is encrypted using ℘κ, to QC. Secondly, it generates a digital
signature by applying Eq.(2). Finally, QUS encrypts questions
using ℘κ and sends back to QC signed with its signature. Sup-
pose, there exists an eavesdropper named B between QC and
QUS. B wants to steal credentials of QUS along with questions
that QUS sends to QC and also wants to send false data to QC.
B catches data between QUS and QC and B wants to extract D2
and D5 data, as shown in Fig. 3. In order to extract data, B re-
quires QC’s private key and it’s not available to anyone except
QC. Moreover, there is no feasible solution to extract private
key from public key by reverse engineering or guessing, as dis-
cussed in Proposition 1. However, B wants to send false data
encrypted by ℘κ to QC. But when QUS send questions to QC,
QUS signs the question with its signature. From the signature,
QC verifies the actual source of the data. As B needs the sig-
nature of QUS, B cannot send false data until it obtains QUS’s
signature and QUS’s signature is not only publicly unavailable,
but also QUS never share its signature with other people apart
from sharing with QC in an encrypted form. As a result, B can-
not achieve any of the aforementioned objectives and thus B’s
activity has no effect on the communication between QUS and
QC.
Proposition 3. QSP selection in BSSSQSmaster is totally random
and is free from compromised QSPs.
Proof. Before the exam, BSSSQSmaster selects a QSP and sends
that QSP reference to BSSSQSminion. This process is totally
random. Before selecting a QSP, BSSSQSmaster selects a set
of 10 prime numbers. Each prime number is selected follow-
ing the uniform distribution, as shown in Eq. (7). Let, (P) is
the set of prime numbers and ρ is the set of already selected
prime numbers. So, the probability of selecting prime numbers
P(P − ρ). However, after selecting the set of prime numbers,
two prime numbers are picked from that set, based on a times-
tamp value, for further processing. Finally, QSP is selected by
employing Eq. (8) which gives a random QSP number among
the set of QSPs. BSSSQSmaster is well protected scheme. By
any chance, if any QSP becomes compromised, BSSSQSminion
notifies BSSSQSmaster about that question. BSSSQSmaster ex-
cludes that compromised QSP from the selection process by
employing Eq. (6) which makes the selection process free from
compromised QSPs.
Proposition 4. QSPs and smart contract are secure from phys-
ical attacks by both insiders and outsiders.
Proof. Physical attacks are one kind of attack which involves
exploiting the weakest point by the attacker to breach the se-
curity system. There are different kinds of physical attacks,
such as (1) walk-in, (2) break-in, (3) sneak-in, and (4) dam-
age equipment. However, attackers may not always come from
outside. Sometimes a person from the inside may also harm
the system. As we discussed in Introduction that sometimes
teacher or authority may leak the question, so it’s very im-
portant to give protection from the attack which is caused by
both outsider and insider. BSSSQS imposes a timelock on the
QSPs and the smart contract. If anyone tries to access both
of them before the allowed time, the system notifies not only
BSSSQSmaster but also BSSSQSminion. Suppose, an attacker X
from inside wants to steal QSPs. X disables the connection of
BSSSQSminion and tries to copy QSPs from disk. QSPs access
permission is locked which can be unlocked by the permission
from BSSSQSmaster. However, X somehow bypasses the ac-
cess protection and start to copy. An internal monitoring system
monitors this activity and changes QSPs auditing time, which
changes the hash of QSPs and breaks the chain of the block.
When BSSSQSminion comes to online, BSSSQSminion notifies
BSSSQSmaster and BSSSQSmaster excludes the BSSSQSminion
from taking exam due to QSPs blocks are not chained together.
However, after copying the QSPs, X needs a private key to un-
lock both QSPs and smart contract which are encrypted by em-
ploying Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) respectively. In Proposition 1,
we have discussed that it’s not feasible to guess a 256-bit key.
Therefore, copying the QSPs is not going to help X. This out-
come is the same for the outsider also. In this way, QSP and
smart contract are secure from physical attacks by both insiders
and outsiders.
Proposition 5. Smart contract is well protected because it con-
tains keys for unlocking QSP.
Proof. While sending QSPs to BSSSQSminion, a smart contract
is sent along with QSPs. QSPs are not only encrypted using
their hashes, but also using a timestamp τc and a random hash
S~. In order to decrypt the selected QSP by employing Eq.
(10) and Eq. (11), BSSSQSminion also needs τc and S~ along
with the selected QSP hash. BSSSQSmaster creates a smart con-
tract containing hashes of the QSPs, τc and S~. When a QSP’s
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hash code is provided in the smart contract, the smart contract
decrypts the provided QSP. Therefore, in order to decrypt a
QSP, BSSSQSminion has to go through the smart contract be-
cause smart contract holds the other two keys. However, before
sending QSP, BSSSQSmaster encrypts the smart contract using
Eq. (5). According to Proposition 4, the smart contract is pro-
tected using a timestamp lock along with an encryption tech-
nique, and breaking the security is not feasible. Thus, we can
say that the smart contract is well protected and holds keys to
unlock the QSP.
Proposition 6. QSPs in BSSSQSminion are tamper-proof.
Proof. QSPs in BSSSQSminion are stored in blockchain. In
blockchain, data are stored in blocks which are linked to-
gether [1]. For example, (n + 1)th block holds the hash of nth
block. In blockchain, a block contains a nonce, timestamp,
transactions and a Merkle tree which contains hashes of the
transactions. A hash is the identity of a block which is gen-
erated from aforementioned properties. If any value in the
transaction changes, the value of Merkle tree also changes. As
Merkle tree value changes, the hash of the block also changes
as the hash is totally dependent on the value of each property.
In this way, if any illegal changes occur, it can be detected
very easily in the blockchain. However, any illegal activities
on QSPs are also detectable as QSPs are stored in blockchain.
Thus, QSPs become tamper-proof.
Proposition 7. QSPs are distributed among all BSSSQSminion
in order to reduce the load of BSSSQSmaster.
Proof. Blockchain is a distributed ledger which is distributed
among the participating nodes and each participant holds the
same copy of the data [1]. BSSSQS applies this concept in or-
der to distribute the QSPs to BSSSQSminion which reduces its
load from distributing QSPs at the exam time and to maintain
the security of these QSPs remotely. When it’s time for the
exam,
BSSSQSmaster just passes the hash of a QSP and a secret key
for unlocking the smart contract instead of a whole QSP which
reduces the load on the system. However, QSPs are occupy-
ing storage space of BSSSQSminion and with the increase of
QSPs, storage space also occupies very quickly, which may cre-
ate issues in the space of the storage. In order to mitigate that,
when the exam finishes, BSSSQSminion removes QSPs from its
storage and makes space free. With the help of blockchain, it
becomes very easy to manage QSPs securely in a distributed
way.
4.2. Performance comparison
A comparative study between BSSSQS and existing mod-
els, such as Chang et al.[49], Kaya et. al[50], Yang[51], Lu et
al.[52], Zhai et al.[53], Guzman et al.[57], Henke[54], Rashad
et al.[58], Vasupongayya et al.[59], Sheshadri et al.[60], Younis
et al.[55], is provided in Table 2 by considering the following
features to compare the proposed BSSSQS with the existing ex-
amination management system models.
• Secure login - This feature covers security in the login pro-
cess like password encryption, random password, etc. Pro-
posed BSSSQS along with all of the existing models which
we mentioned in Table 2 ensure secure login for the users.
• Random QSP generation - This feature generates QSP ran-
domly from a list of questions. So that, the person who
provides questions cannot predict which question may
come in the exam. BSSSQS randomly generates QSPs
from the provided questions and among the existing sys-
tems, Chang et al.[49], Lu et al.[52], Zhai et al.[53], Kaya
et. al[50], and Younis et al.[55] applied this feature in their
proposed models.
• QSP encryption - This feature encrypts QSP so that unau-
thorized persons can not access it. QSPs can be encrypted
employing symmetric encryptions or asymmetric encryp-
tions. BSSSQS provides two-phase encryption process so
that QSPs can be more secure and among the existing sys-
tems no one mentioned about encrypting QSPs.
• Random QSP selection - This feature supports the se-
lection of a QSP randomly before the exam. The ben-
efits of the random selection of QSP is that no one can
guess the selected QSP. BSSSQS randomly select a QSP
from the provided QSPs and among the existing systems,
Henke[54], Kaya et. al[50], and Younis et al.[55] supports
this feature in their proposed models.
• Timestamp lock - This feature helps to impose a restriction
of time on QSPs so that no one can access QSPs before the
allowed time. BSSSQS imposes a timestamp lock on the
QSPs along with an alert system. No one can access QSPs
before the notified time and if anyone tries to access QSPs
before the notification, an alert system notifies regarding
this unauthorized activity and among of the existing mod-
els, only BSSSQS supports this concept.
• Blockchain support - This feature supports the inclusion
of blockchain technology. In BSSSQS, QSPs store in the
blockchain along with a smart contract. BSSSQS utilizes
the feature of data security and integrity of blockchain in
order to maintain QSPs security throughout the system.
Among of the mentioned models, only BSSSQS employs
blockchain in the system.
• Distributed Sharing - This feature covers sharing of
questions among the exam centre in a distributed way.
BSSSQS shares QSPs among the remote exam centres
with the support of blockchain. Due to blockchain, it be-
comes easy to maintain the security of QSPs remotely.
However, apart from BSSSQS, others are fully centralized
systems whose manages QSP and exam within itself.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a secured QS scheme ex-
ploiting the security mechanism of blockchain. In this scheme,
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Random QSP
generation
no no no no no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
QSP encryption no no no no no no no no no no no yes
Random QSP
selection
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Blockchain
support
no no no no no no no no no no no yes
Distributed
Sharing
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Table 2: Performance comparison between BSSSQS and existing models
QSP experiences two-phase encryption in order to prevent un-
ethical access before the exam. Moreover, a restriction of time
is issued in the proposed scheme so that every minion has to
wait for system permission in order to initiate the decryption
process of QSP. Furthermore, QSP is selected by master em-
ploying the proposed randomize algorithm. The combination
of these features can provide a secured QS system. We have an-
alyzed BSSSQS’s security by proposing different propositions
and proved each proposition with respect to BSSSQS which
demonstrate the feasibility of BSSSQS’s security against dif-
ferent attacks. We have compared the performance of our pro-
posed scheme with other existing education management tech-
niques. Based on the theoretical comparison, it can be demon-
strated that BSSSQS is more secure than other models. Due to
the use of blockchain concept, unethical access to the proposed
system will be most challenging. Moreover, we have designed
BSSSQS in a flexible way, where the modules are loosely cou-
pled; as a result, any module can be replaced with a new mod-
ule easily. Therefore, it can be said that BSSSQS can be a
promising approach for providing proper security to mitigate
QPL problem in the future smart education system. Further-
more, the proposed system can also be used to share sensitive
documents with little or no modification, which can be sub-
jected to future works.
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